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Abstract 
The rise in entrepreneurial activity over the last 15 years has created space for a nascent 
industry among the public and private sectors: Business Support Organization (BSO). In the 
last years, some BSOs have broadened their offer to include for-profit social ventures. Unlike 
traditional businesses, these ventures try to create a positive social impact while attempting to 
be economically self-sustainable. However, these disparate goals create several paradoxes 
and tensions within the organization of the venture that can put at risk its growth and 
existence. It is relevant to ask whether the support that BSOs offer to social ventures differs 
from that which they offer to traditional ventures. In a qualitative analysis of how BSOs in 
the Skåne region of Sweden understand and work with for-profit social ventures and the 
performing tension inherent to them, results show that there is significant variety between 
BSOs. BSOs that work primarily with traditional ventures do not account for the performing 
tensions when providing guidance, while those BSOs that are socially oriented have widely 
recognized that this and other tensions are an unavoidable part of running a social venture, 
and view them as inherent to the business model. 
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1 Introduction  
The Business Support Organization (BSO) industry has grown significantly in recent years as 
the result of an increase in entrepreneurial activity. The rise of this industry has proven 
interesting for scholars as well (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005; Cohen & Hochberg, 2014). As the 
name states, the role of BSOs is to provide support for new businesses and entrepreneurs at 
different stages of a business’ life cycle, especially the earliest ones. This support translates 
into services such as financing, business advice, networking, office space, and marketing. In 
more recent years, BSOs have opened space for social ventures to benefit from their offerings 
(Shanmugalingam et al., 2011; Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013).  
 
Social ventures have gained academic attention over the last decade as part of the bigger 
phenomenon of social entrepreneurship (Martin & Osberg, 2007). Social ventures bring 
together the social mission of non-profit organizations with the economic vehicles of for-
profit ventures, in order to use commercial activity to achieve a strong central social mission 
(Doherty et al., 2014; Luke and Chu, 2013; Dees and Anderson, 2003). The importance of 
social ventures as part of social entrepreneurship resides in their outcome; they seek 
contribution by improving the quality of life of human beings or the natural ecosystem (Zahra 
& Wright, 2015). Although this merger has shown evidence of providing a positive outcome 
(Yunus et al., 2010), it can also pose a threat to the social ventures’ own sustainability and 
viability (Nee, 2015; McGlade, 2013; Rykaszewski, 2013; Scott & Teasdale, 2012).  
 
Hybrid organizing is defined in literature as “the activities, structures, processes and 
meanings by which organizations make sense of and combine aspects of multiple 
organizational forms” (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Social ventures can be categorized as hybrid 
organizations since they combine aspects from different forms of organizations, meaning 
non-profits or NGOs and for-profit ventures (Battilana & Lee, 2014; McMullen & Warnick, 
2014). The inherent hybridity organization of social ventures results in the organizational 
tensions they face (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Canales 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014).  
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These organizational tensions that are inherent to hybrid organizations are the root of the 
threat to a social venture’s stability. Theory states there are four inherent tensions within this 
organizational structure; organizational, structural, learning, and performing (Smith & Lewis, 
2011; Wilson & Post, 2013; Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013; Battilana & Lee, 2014). We 
shall be looking at the performing tension in particular as it arises from the differing desired 
outcomes of different shareholders and is apparent through the multiple output and resource 
demands on the venture due to those wanted outcomes (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Mason & 
Doherty, 2015; Smith et al., 2013). In contrast, the remaining three tensions relate to a build-
up that comes about as the venture grows, creating a past and the interpersonal relationships 
internal to the venture (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Mason & Doherty, 2015). We are examining a 
time period where the ventures are involved with a Business Support Organization, and as 
such are still in their nascent stage (Aernoudt, 2004; Cohen, 2013). Consequently, the 
ventures don’t have a long-standing history or a lot of interpersonal clash due to their size and 
immaturity, so the performing tension is the most problematic and noticeable tension in the 
ventures’ nascent stage (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Smith et al., 2013; Aernoudt, 2004; Cohen, 
2013). 
 
1.1 Theoretical Gap 
Battilana and Lee (2014) call for a better theoretical understanding of how leaders of 
organizations combat the tensions of hybridity they face. As BSOs take the role of a leader 
and guiding force to the ventures they support, we need a better understanding of how they 
deal with the tensions inherent to the ventures (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). Awareness of 
hybridity and its resultant tensions by the social ventures as well as their stakeholder may 
play a role in countering the negative effect these tensions have on the viability and growth of 
social ventures (Battilana & Lee, 2014). However, researchers are unsure if BSOs, both those 
focused on social ventures and those who work with traditional ventures, have any true effect 
upon the outcome of social ventures (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). While this study will not 
address the effectiveness of BSOs in supporting the ventures they work with, it is useful to 
describe the understanding that BSOs have of social ventures and their inherent tensions, as 
well as the diverse ways in which they offer assistance to the ventures they work with. Such 
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an understanding paves the way for later studies to examine the effectiveness of such 
methods. 
1.2 Aim and Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to better understand how supportive Swedish BSOs are regarding 
social ventures. Special interest is put in finding how aware BSOs are of the tensions social 
ventures face due to their inherent hybridity. We will focus specifically on the performing 
tension identified in Smith et al. (2013) because only the performing tension arises during the 
nascent stage of a venture, when it is working with a BSO (Aernoudt, 2004; Cohen, 2013; 
Smith & Lewis, 2011). Furthermore, we are interested in finding how BSOs, if aware, 
manage their support targeted at dealing with these tensions. To do this we focus upon the 
following research questions: 
 
1. How much awareness do BSOs have of the characteristics of social ventures and the 
tensions related to their hybridity? 
2. Regarding the previous question, what type of support related to hybridity tensions do 
they offer social ventures? 
 
These questions address an exploration of the understanding that BSOs have of social 
ventures and their inherent tensions, and the different ways in which they help the ventures 
they work with. By building upon the research that exists around the tensions related to social 
entrepreneurship and hybridity (Smith, et al., 2013; Battilana, et al., 2012; Besharov & Smith, 
2014) this study can contribute to advancing research in how business support organizations 
see and work with social ventures. 
 
Through the findings of this study, the reader should gain a better understanding of whether 
BSOs recognize the difference in organizational structure present in social venture, the issues 
this causes, and if they adjust their support accordingly. The authors aim to contribute to our 
understanding of how traditional business support organizations work with social ventures 
and their hybridity. 
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1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 has offered an introduction to the context, 
actors and main concepts regarding our research. Chapter 2 offers a theoretical review of 
Business Support Organizations, Social Ventures, Hybridity Organization and Tensions. 
First, we provide a summary for the recent history and explanation of the nature of BSOs, 
their mission and how they work. Next, we explore and review the concept of social ventures 
within social entrepreneurship. We then move to understand how social ventures are hybrid 
organizations and connect that with the tensions they face; specifically, to the performing 
tension. Chapter 3 offers a review of our methodological approach. Chapter 4 presents the 
findings of our research and makes a relation with the overarching literature. Chapter 5 
presents our analysis and discussion of our findings. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the main 
conclusions, for future research. 
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section explores what Business Support 
Organizations are, their role and activity, and the reason for their origin. The authors select 
two types of BSOs for this study and explain this choice. The last paragraph of this section 
identifies a gap in the theoretical knowledge on this topic. The second section explores the 
concepts of social entrepreneurship and social ventures. A specific type of social venture is 
selected for this study, followed by relevant reasoning. The third section delves into the 
concept of hybrid organizing, as it applies to social ventures. This section ends with the 
exploration and description of the paradoxes and tensions that hybrid organizations face. 
2.1 Business Support Organizations: Incubators and 
Accelerators 
The main purpose of BSOs is to support ventures during the start-up period (Aernoudt, 2004; 
Cohen, 2013). To do this, BSOs offer tools and guidance to budding ventures, giving them 
access to resources and networks they otherwise would not have. By backing these nascent 
ventures, BSOs help entrepreneurial activity develop and support regional economic 
development (Cohen, 2013; Cohen & Hochberg, 2014; Ebbers, 2013; Grimaldi & Grandi, 
2005; Aernoudt, 2004). For this thesis, we will focus on two specific types of BSOs: 
incubators and accelerators. Both offer similar programs, and the number of BSOs that work 
exclusively with social ventures has dramatically increased in the recent past (Casasnovas & 
Bruno, 2013). 
 
The authors specifically selected incubators and accelerators because they share a key 
similarity: the set of resources they offer to the ventures they support, which other institutions 
lack (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). This set of resources usually consists of a combination of 
access to a shared working space, mentorship and educational programs, guidance, 
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networking opportunities, and access to external capital. This external capital may come 
either directly from the BSOs, from venture capitalists or business angels, or through grants 
and sponsorships (Bruneel et al., 2011; Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005; Aernoudt, 2004; Cohen, 
2013; Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2015). 
 
Incubators are an old and time-tested form of new-business support in the western world. The 
industry underwent large growth in the early 1980s stemming from a shift in their offering to 
nascent ventures, as they transformed from being a basic shared workspace with limited 
resources, to one that offered additional coaching and mentorship (Bruneel et al., 2011). A 
second evolution led to incubators’ current role: besides mentorship and guidance, they offer 
rent-free working space, business development education, and access to external capital, 
technology and HR services (Bruneel et al., 2011; Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005; Aernoudt, 
2004). 
 
In contrast, accelerators are a new phenomenon, and their origin is contested. Some scholars 
claim that “Y Combinator”, founded in 2005 after the “dotcom” boom in California, was the 
first accelerator (Miller & Bound, 2011; Cohen & Hochberg, 2014). Meanwhile, others claim 
the first accelerators appeared as early as 1987 (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013; Pandey et al., 
2017). 
 
One difference between incubators and accelerators regards the aim of the program itself and 
its structure. The concept of business incubation is to shelter nascent ventures to let them 
grow before becoming independent (Cohen, 2013). It “links technology, capital and know-
how to leverage entrepreneurial talent, accelerate the development of new companies, and 
thus speed the exploitation of technology” (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005 p. 111). This aim is 
focused on developing the entrepreneurs and their ventures. Therefore, incubators take on 
entrepreneurs who are still in the idea stage of their venture, rather than in the development or 
production stages (Soetanto, 2013). In contrast, accelerators aim not to shield the venture 
from the marketplace, but rather speed up the go-to-market process (Cohen, 2013). To 
achieve this, accelerators put a large amount of weight on education of the business 
component within the already existing venture, instead of personal development (Gonzalez-
Uribe & Leatherbee, 2015). Incubators place a larger emphasis upon business model 
development and planning (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005), while accelerators focus on growth 
strategies (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). 
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In terms of structure, the programs’ duration is a key differentiator between organizations. 
Incubator programs typically last between 1 to 7 years (Cohen, 2013; Aernoudt, 2004; Cohen 
& Hochberg, 2014), while accelerator programs last 3 to 6 months (Cohen, 2013; Miller & 
Bound, 2011).  
 
A second main difference is the ownership and funding of these BSOs. Accelerators are more 
likely to be privately owned than incubators (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005). This allows them to 
offer seed or starting capital directly and to provide access to external funding. Alternatively, 
incubators are often state or publicly supported, which forces them to rely upon grants and 
public funding (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). 
 
Accelerators and incubators have been extensively researched in terms of their effectiveness 
in working with traditional ventures (Aernoudt, 2004; Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2015). 
In recent years, other scholars have explored the effectiveness of accelerators and incubators 
that focus exclusively on social ventures (Pandey et al., 2017). Casasnovas and Bruno (2013) 
found that, due to being a new industry with many different models, there is no way of 
knowing if a social venture will effectively benefit from working with a BSO (either socially 
oriented or traditional). However, they found that mentorship from past social entrepreneurs 
positively influences the success of the ventures participating in the programs, with 
limitations (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). One line of research is studying BSOs working with 
conventional ventures (Hallen et al., 2014; Aernoudt, 2004). The other line is looking at the 
effectiveness of BSOs specializing in social ventures. This leaves a gap of research where the 
social venture meets the traditional BSOs, which, until recent years, have worked exclusively 
with traditional ventures. Furthermore, recent literature has noted a misalignment of 
objectives between the BSO and the venture, with the venture looking for specific needs for 
their firm, and the BSOs looking to provide the ventures they support with a standardized 
offering (Soetanto & Jack, 2013). How does this desire to provide a standardized offering by 
the BSO affect the ways in which they address the distinct needs of social ventures? 
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2.2 Social Entrepreneurship and Social Ventures 
The rise of the broad practice of social entrepreneurship and its impact to our society across 
the world has drawn academic attention in the last two decades (Mair & Martí, 2006; Dees, 
2007; Zeyen et al., 2012). Yet, scholars agree that trying to define social entrepreneurship can 
be a confusing task (Loh & Mohtar, 2015; Abu-Saifan, 2012). There is still no agreement as 
to what this concept means and extends to (Choi & Majumdar, 2013), although over the last 
years there has been a dramatic increase of attempts to reach a concluding perspective 
involving different points of view (Martin & Osberg, 2007; Mair & Martí, 2006; 
Weerawardena & Sullivan, 2006). Still, we will provide here an overview of why it exists in 
practice and what its boundaries are. We will then focus on a specific materialization of 
social entrepreneurship: the for-profit social venture. 
 
For this thesis, we will build on the definition of entrepreneurship provided by Davidsson 
(2005), who understands entrepreneurship as “the competitive behaviors that drive the market 
process”. This definition proves useful for three reasons: first, by stating “behavior” it makes 
a distinction between an action taken and mere intentions; second, since that behavior 
“drives” a process, there is an implication of outcomes and results; finally, the “market” 
provides a context of supply and demand in which this behavior occurs (Davidsson, 2005). 
 
Martin & Osberg (2007) understand social entrepreneurship by assessing how the word 
“social” adapts the term “entrepreneurship” into fitting a new role or objective, the pursuit or 
creation of social value (Mair & Marti, 2006; Peredo and McLean, 2006). Different scholars 
agree on understanding social value as the enhancement of the conditions of human beings by 
improving rooted social problems (Seelos & Mair, 2005; Weerawardena & Sullivan, 2006; 
Zeyen et al., 2012). In this sense, literature provides varying characterizations for social 
entrepreneurship. Some focus on the identification of opportunities and the performance of 
activities to disrupt an unfair or negative social order (Martin & Osberg, 2007). Others focus 
on the realization and exploitation of opportunities within that negative order (Mair & Marti, 
2006; Peredo & McLean, 2006), and still others focus on taking advantage of the resources 
available to create social value (Dees, 1998; Reis & Clohesy, 1999; Meyskens et al., 2010). 
In Sweden, “there is currently no overarching legal definition of social entrepreneurship or 
social enterprises” (Persson & Hafen, 2014). 
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This thesis is built on the definition of social entrepreneur as the agent of social 
entrepreneurship (Abu-Saifan, 2012): 
“The social entrepreneur is a mission-driven individual who uses a set of 
entrepreneurial behaviors to deliver a social value to the less privileged, 
all through an entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially 
independent, self-sufficient, or sustainable”. 
2.2.1 For-profit Social Ventures 
This “entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially independent, self-sufficient, or 
sustainable” is what can be found in literature as the for-profit social venture (Dees & 
Anderson, 2003; Yunus, 2010; Agafonow, 2015; Irene et al., 2015). Stressing this definition 
is highly important, as other scholars explicitly state that they use the terms “social 
entrepreneurship organization”, “social enterprise” and “social venture” interchangeably, 
regardless of their profit orientation (Lumpkin et al., 2011; Luke and Chu, 2013). In this 
paper, the terms “social venture” and “for-profit social venture” will be used synonymously. 
These for-profit social ventures are twofold in their objectives: one for their social mission or 
social value creation, and another for their economically sustainable performance and 
business model (Dees & Anderson, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009, Yunus et al., 2010). The 
business activity and the margins it generates aim to support the social venture’s mission and 
are a means to achieve the social goal (Peredo & McLean, 2006). This role is not of less 
importance to the overall viability of the social venture, as it provides the necessary resources 
to operate without relying on grants or donations (Zeyen et al., 2014). Still, ultimately for-
profit social ventures will evaluate their own performance based on the social impact they 
create rather than the money they make (Dees & Anderson, 2003). 
 
While we are utilizing this specific definition of what categorizes social entrepreneurship and 
social ventures, Persson and Hafen (2014) state that there have been numerous attempts to 
define social entrepreneurship. They posit that this may be the result of Sweden’s lack of an 
overarching legal definition. Persson and Hafen (2014) also note that different branches 
within the Swedish government already use differing definitions of social entrepreneurship. 
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Many believe that funding and support structures must be provided with official and widely 
accepted definitions in order to be able to properly provide aid to social ventures (Persson 
and Hafen 2014). Since this study is a descriptive one, knowing how each BSO 
independently understands the nature of social ventures may bring insight into the different 
ways in which each of them understands and handles the tensions faced by the ventures they 
work with. 
2.3 The For-profit Social Venture as a Hybrid 
Organization 
Historically, organizations have been classified according to distinct boundaries dividing 
them between non-profit organizations, public organizations, and for-profit organizations 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Dees & Anderson, 2003; Dees, 1998; Doherty et al., 2014; Mair et 
al., 2012). However, new organizational models known as ‘hybrid organizing’ have blurred 
these boundaries (Doherty et al., 2014; Battilana & Lee, 2014). Hybrid organizing is the 
consequence of ventures attempting to combine multiple organizational forms and identities 
into one (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014). The combination 
of these identities has made organizations face internal competing logics and forces (Douglas, 
2015; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Besharov & Smith, 2014). 
 
The social venture is an example of a hybrid organization (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Jay, 2013; 
Starnawska, 2016; Doherty et al., 2014). For-profit social ventures, specifically, are twofold 
in their objectives: the fulfilment of their social mission and the need to build an 
economically self-sufficient business model (Douglas, 2015; Dees & Anderson, 2003; Zahra 
et al., 2009; Yunus et al., 2010; Doherty et al., 2014; Starnawska, 2016). This objective 
duality mixes the social ambitions traditionally pursued by non-profit organizations with 
economic methods of for-profit organizations, blurring traditionally-held boundaries (Wilson 
& Post, 2013; Lumpkin et al., 2013; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Luke & Chu, 2013; Dees & 
Anderson, 2003).  
 
The dual mission affects the performance assessment of the for-profit social venture, as they 
are evaluated through their economic gain, as well as by their social impact (Battilana and 
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Lee, 2014; Dees & Anderson, 2003; Jay, 2013). This evaluation is referred to as serving a 
“double bottom line” (Dees & Anderson, 2003, p.2). To manage this dual bottom line, for-
profit social ventures keep both the social and economic objectives at the core of their 
organization to safeguard the venture from focusing on one part of its mission at the expense 
of the other (McMullen & Warnick, 2016; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Smith et al., 2012). The 
notion that the success of the venture relies upon these two core values can be conceived as a 
form of “blended value”, which consists of the monetary and social value (Emerson, 2003; 
McMullen & Warnick, 2016). In many institutions, blended value is a byproduct of their 
economic efforts (Emerson, 2003). However, in for-profit social ventures, it is an intended 
primary outcome resulting from their distinct hybrid organizational structure (Wilson & Post, 
2013). 
2.3.1 Paradoxes in Hybrid Organizations 
Due to their combination of charity and economic organizational forms (Battilana & Lee, 
2014; Jay, 2013; Ebrahim et al., 2014), for-profit social ventures experience a set of inherent 
tensions caused by paradoxical aspects of their hybridity (Wilson & Post, 2013; Smith et al. 
2013; Battilana & Lee, 2014). Tensions are conflicts that arise out of the inconsistent 
demands for-profit social ventures face between their two core missions (Mason & Doherty, 
2015; Smith & Lewis, 2011). They emerge from conflicts over how to delegate resources to 
accomplish the economic gain needed to sustain the venture or the social mission that the 
venture aims to carry out (Doherty et al. 2014). 
 
The conflicting demands of the social and economic missions can be understood through 
paradox theory (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Paradox, in this sense, refers to the conflicting yet 
interdependent aspects existing in a social venture (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
Paradoxical relationships in society arise from two logics that, by definition, should be unable 
to simultaneously function, but in actuality are coexistent and codependent on each other to 
remain in balance (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). In a social venture, the loss of the 
economic aspect would alter the core identity of the organization, transforming it from a for-
profit venture into a non-profit organization (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Paradox 
theory can be used in this sense to explore how hybrid organizations such as for-profit social 
ventures are able to manage their competing interests (Gonin et al, 2012; Smith & Lewis, 
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2011; Smith et al., 2013). The competing demands for-profit social ventures experience arise 
through the management of the dual demands held by stakeholders (Mason & Doherty, 2015; 
Battilana & Lee, 2014). The paradoxes, and associated tensions, for-profit social ventures 
face from their dual missions can be categorized into four areas: performing, organizing, 
belonging, and learning (Jay, 2013; Smith et al., 2012; Smith & Lewis, 2011). We will focus 
on the overarching paradoxes that Smith and Lewis (2011) identified, to further examine if 
BSOs consider the difference in organizational structure when working with for-profit social 
ventures. Table 1. below summarizes a description of each paradox and how they materialize. 
 
 
Paradox: Where tensions emerge: Example in Social Business Ventures 
Performing  Emerges through the different goals 
held by the stakeholders in a social 
venture and through the different 
methods of measuring those goals. 
The two organizational models need to 
rely upon two different measuring 
metrics. How can the organization be 
successful in one while not destroying 
the other? 
Organizing  Emerges from the internal dynamics of 
the organization such as the act of 
hiring skilled workers to increase the 
venture's profitability or hiring 
“disadvantaged employees as a means 
of achieving the social mission” 
(Smith, et al. 2013, p.410). 
Who should the organization hire? Do 
they prioritize hiring people to fulfill 
their mission or people orientated 
towards economic gain?  
How much of the organization's social 
mission should be integrated into its 
organizational structure? 
Belonging  Emerges out of the different identities 
held by subgroups that make up the 
venture as well as the difference in 
identities held by those involved with 
the venture; some may identify more 
with the social mission while others 
with the economic vision. 
The different presentation of the 
organization’s make-up to different 
current or potential stakeholders. If they 
are looking for investment capital they 
may show-off more of the economic 
gain while if the venture is after public 
funding they may expand the social 
aspect. 
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Learning  Emerges from the discrepancy in the 
horizons of the dual outcomes of a for-
profit social venture. 
For a social venture to be successful it 
looks to the long-term outcome while 
an economic venture looks at the short-
term outcome of its actions. 
Table 1: Paradoxes in hybrid organizations (Smith & Lewis, 2011) 
2.3.2 The Performing Paradox and its Tensions 
This study is focused on the performing paradox and the tensions it creates, which emerge 
through the two distinct missions associated with for-profit social ventures (Gonin et al. 
2012). This paradox is apparent through the multiple output and resource demands that 
ventures face due to their various and conflicting goals (Mason & Doherty, 2015; Smith et 
al., 2013). Tensions arise through stakeholders placing preference on one expectation over 
another (Mason & Doherty, 2015). By doing so they take the venture’s dual missions out of a 
state of equilibrium, resulting in one of the major tensions of the performing paradox, the 
struggle between the social and economic objectives (Mason & Doherty, 2015). If more 
weight is placed upon the quantifiable metrics of the organization, the economic mission may 
override the social objective (Smith et al., 2013). On the other hand, if the entrepreneur's 
passion for social betterment is prioritized, the financial sustainability of the venture may 
break down (Smith et al., 2013; Battilana & Lee, 2014). This movement of a social venture to 
focus on either the financial side or the social side of their mission is referred to as “mission-
drift” (Ebrahim, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Battilana & Lee, 2014).  
 
A consequence of mission-drift may be the failure of the social venture (Ebrahim et al., 
2014). However, if they don't fail, they rarely remain hybrid in nature and instead become 
either a non-profit organization or for-profit entity (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Due to the 
potential of drifting away from one of their two core missions, for-profit social ventures must 
find equilibrium between the acquisition of resources to achieve their social vision and 
maintain their competitive advantage in the marketplace (Doherty et al., 2014). Because the 
goal of a BSO is to generate growth through creating a working business model, they may 
perceive this tension as a problem to be fixed within a hybrid organization rather than an 
  18 
inherent aspect of a for-profit social venture (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013; Grimaldi & Grandi, 
2005; Cohen, 2013; Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2015). 
2.3.3 What About the Other Paradoxes? 
In the time that ventures are a part of a BSO, they are still in a nascent stage, and as such 
have not yet developed a long history or acquired many stakeholders (Aernoudt, 2004; 
Cohen, 2013).  
 
Of the paradoxes inherent in hybrid organization, solely performing tensions emerge in the 
nascent stages (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Others emerge as the venture grows: learning tensions 
arise from long term growth aspects, belonging tensions emerge from conflicting identities 
held by groups of individuals involved with the venture, and organizational tensions emerge 
from structural and organizational difficulties arising from the expansion of the ventures 
stakeholders (Smith & Lewis, 2011). This is why we have chosen to focus solely on the 
performing tension. 
 
The tensions developed from the learning paradox evolve from the juxtaposition of venture-
holding to multiple horizons (Gonin et al., 2012; Smith and Lewis, 2011). These tensions 
develop as organizations strive for growth, scale, and flexibility over the long term, while 
also seeking stability and certainty in the short term (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Smith et al., 
2013). The learning paradox also creates specific tension around growth and scalability, 
because a social venture’s local effect becomes minimized as it attempts to grow (Smith et 
al., 2013). Hence, as for-profit social ventures aim to grow to increase their social mission’s 
impact, they also jeopardize the mission’s ability to act effectively (Smith et al., 2013).  
 
The belonging paradox relates to the interpersonal relationships and identities found in for-
profit social ventures (Smith & Lewis, 2011). The tensions formed from this paradox develop 
through the interpersonal conflicts from clashing identities (Mason & Doherty, 2015). These 
tensions emerge as stakeholders create individuals, and groups identify with different aspects 
of the organization, creating an inconsistent identity with some feeling distanced from the rest 
within the organization (Mason & Doherty, 2015; Lewis, 2000; Smith et al., 2013). Being 
nascent ventures, organizations in BSOs typically have few people directly involved with the 
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venture (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). The internal aspect the belonging paradox creating 
tensions of identity between groups relies upon a variety of stakeholders to be significant 
(Smith et al., 2013). 
 
Organizing paradoxes surface in the processes of the organization, and tensions form out of a 
conflict within the processes between differing organizational, cultural and practical 
requirements (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Mason & Doherty, 2014; Smith et al., 2013). These 
conflicts arise from the venture’s need of an employee with contrasting profiles (Smith et al., 
2013) as well as through the internal structure of the organization as it grows (Mason & 
Doherty, 2015). Microfinance offers a good example, as the loan officer needs to have good 
interpersonal skills to work with loan recipients’ emotional and psychological barriers, while 
also being analytical to manage financial matters (Smith et al., 2013; Canales, 2014). 
Through the example of microfinance, we see a tension between the structured processes 
required of the financial economic model and the social mission’s requirement of the process 
being flexible to accommodate non-traditional loan recipients (Canales, 2014). 
2.4  Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce, explore and summarize the current literature and 
knowledge about the research questions of this thesis: First, how much awareness do BSOs 
have of the characteristics of social ventures and the tensions related to their hybridity? And 
second, what type of support do BSOs offer social ventures in relation to their hybridity 
tensions? 
 
First, regarding the BSOs, we stated that their main purpose is to help nascent ventures 
during the start-up period (Aernoudt, 2004; Cohen, 2013). For this study, two specific types 
of BSOs were selected: incubators and accelerators, which have a set of resources that they 
can offer to their supporting ventures (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013). Accelerators and 
incubators have been researched in terms of their effectiveness working with traditional 
ventures (Aernoudt, 2004; Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2015). This leaves a gap of 
research where the social venture meets the traditional BSO.  
 
  20 
Second, we derived a definition of social entrepreneurship and the for-profit social venture. 
This thesis is built on Abu-Saifan’s (2012) definition of the social entrepreneur as “a mission-
driven individual who uses a set of entrepreneurial behaviors to deliver a social value to the 
less privileged, all through an entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially independent, 
self-sufficient, or sustainable”. This entity is found in literature as the for-profit social venture 
(Dees & Anderson, 2003; Yunus, 2010; Agafonow, 2015; Irene et al., 2015). 
 
Then, we set out to explain what hybrid organizing is and why social ventures are an example 
of it. Hybrid organizing is the consequence of ventures attempting to combine multiple 
organizational forms and identities into one (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Battilana & Lee, 2014; 
Doherty et al., 2014). For-profit social ventures are explicitly twofold in their objectives: the 
fulfillment of their social mission and the development of an economically self-sufficient 
business model (Douglas, 2015; Dees & Anderson, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009; Yunus et al., 
2010; Doherty et al., 2014; Starnawska, 2016). 
 
Finally, we explored the paradoxes that hybrid organizations face and their consequential 
tensions. We placed our focus on the performing tension. For-profit social ventures 
experience a set of inherent tensions caused by paradoxical aspects of their hybridity (Wilson 
& Post, 2013; Smith et al. 2013; Battilana & Lee, 2014). Tensions are conflicts that arise out 
of the inconsistent demands for-profit social ventures face between their two core missions 
(Mason & Doherty, 2015; Smith 7 Lewis, 2011). The performing tension emerges through 
the different goals held by the stakeholders in a social venture and through the different 
methods of measuring those goals (Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
 
As such, the authors have developed an operational definition of the type of BSO we are 
utilizing for this research. From there the authors have narrowed down the field of social 
entrepreneurship to for-profit social ventures as a way of highlighting the hybridity of their 
organizational structure. Finally, through literature on paradox theory we understand that the 
specialized tensions these hybrid organizations face are a naturally occurring part of their 
structuring (Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
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3 Methodology 
This chapter presents and discusses the research method for this thesis. It starts by 
introducing the aim and design of the research. Then, it develops how the samples were 
selected and gives a short description of each one. Later, it explains how the data was 
collected from the samples, and the authors examine the interview guide used to collect the 
data. Afterwards, we explain how the data was analyzed. Finally, we acknowledge the 
limitations that are present in this research. 
3.1 Research Design 
The aim of the research was to understand how much awareness do BSOs – specifically 
accelerators and incubators – have of the characteristics of social ventures. Also, what type of 
support they offer to the for-profit social ventures they work with regarding the performing 
tension. To achieve this, it was necessary to obtain data directly from the BSOs. This 
informed us on their practice towards for-profit social ventures. The data was obtained by 
interviewing people who, during the study, were working in a BSO and whose position 
involved working with social ventures that were part of his or her incubator or accelerator 
program. That combination provided insight into how each BSO worked and how they 
perceived and worked with the social ventures that were part of their BSO.  Used as a “data 
source”, interviewing proved useful to “gather rich, empirical data” about an unpredictable 
event such as the relationships between the BSOs and the social ventures (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 28). 
 
 
A pilot study was conducted before the interview process. This study consisted of two 
preliminary interviews with potential sample cases. The result of this preliminary study led 
the authors to conclude that the interviewees were not necessarily conscious of the 
boundaries and domains of social ventures and of the consequences of how these were 
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organized. This allowed the authors to “begin the investigation with a fairly clear focus” 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). Therefore, when interviewing the samples, the questions were 
presented in two stages: first, an awareness stage (of the characteristics of a social venture 
and of the performing tension); and second, a practice or action stage based on the answers of 
the first stage. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
The sample selection was based on purposive sampling, and more specifically, on theoretical 
sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Robinson, 2014; Bryman & Bell, 2015). The objective for this 
decision was “to choose cases which were likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory” 
and to increase the validity of the relationship within the multiple cases to create theoretical 
premises (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
The authors’ choice to solely look at incubators and accelerators arose from our 
understanding of literature on the similarities between them in terms of offerings, processes, 
procedures, and action (Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013; Cohen, 2013). Both accelerators and 
incubators utilize mentorship and business education to help founders through the start-up 
and growth processes (Cohen, 2013). In addition, they both offer a shared working space with 
other ventures, access to capital, guidance, and other forms of assistance (Casasnovas & 
Bruno, 2013). These similarities between the organizations’ function and structure mean that 
the start-ups see similar forms of support through both ventures. In contrast, other BSOs, 
such as business angels, often do not share a working space with the ventures they have 
invested in, nor do they provide one for use (Cohen, 2013).   Resultantly they often do not 
have a direct impact on the direction of the venture, while accelerator directors often work 
closely alongside the ventures in their program offering support and guidance (Cohen, 2013).   
 
The authors chose not to interview the ventures that have resided within the BSOs 
interviewed, as our interest is specifically in the BSOs’ awareness of the characteristics of the 
social ventures, the tensions related to their hybridity and possible means of support. This 
study is building on the works of Smith, Besharov, Wessels, & Chertok (2012), Smith & 
Lewis (2011) and Smith, Gonin, & Besharov (2013) which state that these tensions are 
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inherent parts of hybrid organizations. As such, the authors make the assumption that these 
paradoxes and their corresponding tensions exist in all hybrid organizational forms. Under 
this assumption, we aim to solely understand how BSOs identify and engage with these 
tensions possessed by the social ventures rather than the ways in which ventures work with 
them internally. 
 
The criteria used to identify BSOs to study included the type of BSO, their geographic 
location to account for geographic homogeneity (Robinson, 2014, p. 27), and willingness or 
ability to work with social ventures, as well as previous experience in doing so. After each 
interview, the authors discussed the preliminary results to discover what more was needed to 
know. Through replication logic, the “emergent relationships” found after the aggregation of 
these results helped “enhance the confidence in the validity of these relationships” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Overall, this strategy answers to the aim of this thesis, which is building 
theory rather than testing it (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
 
The sample selection was carried out in the following process: first, the authors searched for 
all institutions in the Skåne region of Sweden that identified themselves as an incubator or 
accelerator for nascent ventures with no more than five years of existence. To do this, the 
authors utilized their personal networks and internet database searches to locate regional 
business support organizations. Research through personal contacts as well as online was 
further utilized to ensure that these organizations offered support to social ventures. To meet 
the authors’ criteria, the BSOs sampled should have previously provided support to nascent 
for-profit social ventures as defined in section 2.2.1. Out of those institutions identified, the 
authors selected the individuals that held the role or title of business developer, mentor or 
coach. This helped assure that the potential interviewees worked directly with participating 
ventures. 
 
A total of 15 potential samples were found, distributed between the cities of Malmö, Lund 
and Helsingborg. The potential samples were contacted by electronic mails, telephone calls 
and visiting their office. From the 15 potential samples seven agreed to participate, five 
adduced time constraints to refuse to participate and three did not respond. Upon agreeing to 
participate, a meeting was scheduled between the samples and the authors to carry out the 
interviews. 
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3.2.1 Samples 
 
Below is a list of all the participating samples and a short description of the BSO they work 
for. The samples’ names have been replaced by Greek letters to guard their identity.  
 
Alfa – interviewed twice, first interview: in person, second interview: in person  
Alfa is an incubator founded in 1983 and based in Lund. Alfa does not focus on one industry 
but offers start-ups business coaching in public relations, finances, sales, marketing, and pitch 
training. Through Alfa, start-ups also gain access to a shared working space and a large 
network of entrepreneurs. Alfa has previously worked with multiple social ventures and is 
currently working with another at the time of our interview. The interviewee has been 
working in Alfa since 2013. 
 
Beta & Gamma – interviewed twice (both interviewees), first interview: in person, second 
interview: phone 
(Two separate interviewees from the same organization. Shall be referred to simply as Beta 
due to our interest in how the organization rather than the individual works with the 
venture.) 
Beta & Gamma in its current form was established in 2009; however, there is a history of 
similar organizations going back to the mid 1990’s. Beta & Gamma is a Lund University 
operated support organization for those looking for business advice, investment, financing 
assistance, help with patenting, law, and licensing, as well as education and inspiration. The 
organization's aim is to offer commercialization support to researchers and students of Lund 
University free of charge. While they do not run their own incubator or accelerator, they 
work with Zeta to offer the option to those they coach. Both interviewees have worked with 
different forms of nascent social ventures during their time with the BSO. The interviewee’s 
have worked within Beta as it is now for eight (interviewee Beta) and three (interviewee 
Gamma) years respectively.  
 
Delta – interviewed once, in person 
Delta is an accelerator program based out of Helsingborg. Founded in the spring of 2015, 
Delta is a municipality-funded organization focusing on technology-based start-ups. They 
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offer a 12-week (3 month) program, giving their start-ups access to workshops, investors, 
mentorship and a global network of entrepreneurs. Delta has worked with multiple social 
ventures in the nascent stage; the authors’ respondent worked personally alongside two 
ventures. One of these is finding success in their product, while the other has turned to the 
non-profit sector. The interviewee has been working in Delta for three years.  
 
Epsilon – interviewed twice, first interview: in person, second interview: phone 
Epsilon is a Helsingborg-based accelerator program funded by Tillväxtverket (a European 
Union funded organization), Lund University, and the city of Helsingborg. Epsilon focuses 
on social entrepreneurial ventures with the aim of giving them the tools needed to succeed. 
Founded in 2015, they offer a 3-month program giving start-ups access to a working space, 
mentorship, models, and continued support once the program has ended. Epsilon works 
exclusively with entrepreneurs with socially oriented ventures. As an organization, they have 
worked more than 21 different social ventures. The interviewee has been with Epsilon since 
its inception in 2015. 
 
Zeta – interviewed twice, first interview: in person, second interview: Skype 
Zeta is an incubator funded by Lund University, located in Lund and Helsingborg. Founded 
in 2001, the incubator’s aim is to help students and graduates realize their start-up ideas. 
They offer a working space, guidance, and networking. Along with the incubator, Zeta offers 
meetings with students to help guide potential business ideas and generate entrepreneurial 
interest. Zeta has worked with only a handful of social ventures in their organization. 
However, they feel this will grow in the next few years, as interest in this form of business 
type seems to be growing. The interviewee has worked within Zeta two years.  
 
 
Kappa – interviewed twice, first interview: in person, second interview: phone 
Kappa is a business advisor located in all 25 counties of Sweden and funded through the 
European Union, the Swedish government, consulting revenue, public sector and other 
supporting organizations. Founded in 1992, the organization’s focus lies in helping start 
socially oriented companies through advice and counselling. Kappa also helps new 
businesses seek funding, analyze local markets, and establish collaboration between 
entrepreneurs. Like Epsilon, Kappa works exclusively with ventures that have a social aspect. 
As an organization, they have worked with hundreds around Sweden. Our contact directly 
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started his career with Epsilon and has worked with many of the social ventures in the Skåne 
region. The interviewee has worked within Kappa for one year and was a founding member 
of Epsilon. 
3.3 Data Collection Method and Interview Guide 
The data from the samples was collected through semi-structured, in-depth interviews; this 
way, the focus would be put on the “interviewee's perspective” (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The 
authors utilized two interview rounds based on an interview guide that would allow the 
authors to cover every aspect necessary for the research, but that could also provide enough 
flexibility to allow the samples to narrate, give opinions, explain behaviors and touch on 
other subjects (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This method ensured that the results from the different 
samples could be compared across them (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  
 
The interview guide (Appendix A) allowed the authors to touch on specific and relevant 
topics (Bryman & Bell, 2015). It started by asking the interviewee to describe his/her role and 
the accelerator or incubator they worked for. Then, the interviewer asked for his/her 
definition and understanding of social entrepreneurship and social ventures as a general topic. 
Follow-up questions were asked to allow the authors to assess the respondent’s understanding 
on these topics with the relevant literature. The respondent was asked to deepen his/her 
answers by taking a position on specific points such as: should profit be involved within 
his/her definition of social entrepreneurship and social ventures; what types of organization 
fit inside the boundaries of social entrepreneurship and social ventures? The first section of 
the interview was additionally utilized to create a better understanding of how in depth the 
respondent had worked with social ventures. This was done both as a way to insure the BSO 
had experience with working alongside social ventures as the authors defined them as well as 
a way to understand those interactions.  
 
Then, the interviewee was asked to relate his/her experience working with social ventures 
within the context of a BSO. The purpose of these questions was to ensure that not only had 
the BSO worked with social ventures but that the respondent in question also had personal 
experience with them. This section, as mentioned in the research design, moved on two steps. 
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The first step focused on identification and awareness; therefore, on the methods, processes, 
and mental frameworks that the interviewee applied to identify these types of ventures and 
the tensions they face. The second step focused on actions taken; namely, methods and 
behaviors in response to the first stage. A total of seven interviews were held in the first 
round. They lasted on average 45 minutes to an hour and were all conducted in person.  
 
The second interview round was used to clarify topics noticed by the authors during the 
transcription of the interviews and the coding of the resulting data. To do this the authors 
used a secondary interview guide (Appendix B). The secondary interview guide allowed the 
authors to gain a more complete understanding of the viewpoint on social businesses from the 
respondent’s perspective. Furthermore, the general guide was left open-ended as to allow the 
authors to aim it towards aspects the interviewee mentioned in the first round. The second 
round of interviews were conducted in three manners: in person, over the phone, as well as 
over Skype. Of the seven respondents in the first round of interviews one was unable to be 
interviewed in the second-round due to time conflicts. The second-round interviews lasted on 
average 15 minutes. 
 
A total of 13 interviews were conducted in the two rounds. Every interview was digitally 
recorded and transcribed in its original language (English). Recording the interview allowed 
the authors to increase their attention to what the interviewee said and thus generate follow-
up questions (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Then, transcribing the recordings to paper proved a 
useful time and effort investment (Bryman and Bell, 2015) to allow the authors to analyze the 
raw data more clearly.  
3.4 Data Analysis 
The transcript of each interview was analyzed with an open (or initial) coding (Charmaz, 
2006; Bryman and Bell, 2015). Each transcript represented a unique and individual case 
sample which could “stand on its own as an analytical unit” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
The process consisted of breaking down the raw data into smaller groups of data that are 
interconnected and share a common logic or characteristics (Charmaz 2006; Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). Analysis included a search for patterns, contradictions and relationships between 
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the cases and comparison to the theoretical model, thus allowing theory to surface 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
3.5 Limitations 
The first limitation found in this study regards the sampling. The authors worked with an 
alternative procedure to the traditional method within theoretical sampling. This alternative 
sampling procedure follows a theoretical criterion based on the concepts explored in the 
Literary Review. Yet, the sample was built entirely before the data was gathered and not built 
step by step after each interview. Still, there is no exact way of proceeding with theoretical 
sampling (Robinson, 2014; Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
 
The second limitation is based upon the assumption we make through Smith, Besharov, 
Wessels, & Chertok (2012), Smith, & Lewis (2011) and Smith, Gonin, & Besharov (2013) 
that the tensions that are supposedly inherent in hybrid organizations are truly there. By 
looking solely at BSOs and not interviewing the social ventures the BSOs have worked with 
the authors risk that the tensions provided are not present in a way the BSOs have control 
over. 
 
The choice of limiting our study to incubators and accelerators also limits our findings, as 
other BSOs, such as venture capital firms, may be more or less aware of the tensions 
hybridity present. By excluding them from our study, we are reflecting solely on the 
population of incubators and accelerators rather than the BSO community as a whole. Thus, 
the authors limit the generalizability of our study to exclude the other forms of BSO models 
that exist. 
 
The transferability of this study can also be questioned. Although theoretical sampling 
requires a certain amount of homogeneity (Robinson, 2014), this group is constrained to a 
geographical area and general context (Bryman & Bell, 2015) that literature does not 
necessarily sustain as representative of the theoretical model and theoretical review for which 
this study is based on. Following this logic, the theoretical saturation that is reached in the 
results of this study may be questioned as well. 
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Fifth, the tension approached in this study is limited to the performing tension (Smith & 
Lewis, 2011). Smith & Lewis (2011) provide three more tensions: organizing, belonging and 
learning. Our reasoning for focusing solely on the performing tension is provided in the 
Literary Review section. This approach may limit the overall understanding of the 
relationship between BSOs and the social ventures they work with.  
3.6 Chapter Summary 
The aim of the research was to understand how BSOs, specifically accelerators and 
incubators, understand and manage the nature of for-profit social ventures and the hybridity 
tensions that result. Consequently, it was necessary to obtain data directly from the BSOs. 
 
To carry out the research aim, the sample selection was based on purposive sampling, and, 
more specifically, on theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Robinson, 2014; Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). The samples were the business “developer”, “mentor” or “coach” that worked in 
a BSO and with social ventures as part of their program. The data from the samples was 
collected through semi-structured, in-depth interviews in order to put the focus on the 
“interviewee's perspective” (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The transcript of each interview was 
analyzed with an open (or initial) coding (Charmaz, 2006; Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
 
Finally, five important limitations were found regarding the sampling, our assumptions of 
tensions from literature, BSO type, transferability and the theoretical focus of the study. 
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4 Findings 
4.1 BSOs’ Awareness of the Characteristics of Social 
Ventures Varies 
When asked the questions, “How would you define social entrepreneurship?”, and “How 
would you define a social venture?” the respondents’ answers varied. Generally, a single 
definition was provided that was intended to encompass both social entrepreneurship and 
social ventures. Because of this, it can be argued that there is variety in the awareness that 
BSOs have of social ventures, varying in terms of the different features that compose the 
concept of social entrepreneurship and social venture. 
 
Three of the cases presented the notion of “giving” a positive outcome to “society” in their 
definitions of social entrepreneurship, but only two of these (Zeta and Beta) included the 
possibility of the existence of a profit mechanism, or the collection of revenue that is intrinsic 
to a traditional business. 
 
“[The activity of] ...an entrepreneur that works with the objectivity of 
making a positive impact on the planet” (Epsilon, Interview, 11 April 
2017). 
 
“I would say it's something to do good, to give back something good. And 
maybe in combination with some kind of profit” (Zeta, Interview, 3 April 
2017). 
 
  31 
“I guess the main goal is to give something back to society […] an 
organization where you can have some profit; yet, the main goal is not to 
be rich and earn lots of money, but [to create] a social impact that can be 
good for people or good for the environment, and it’s at the core, not as 
Corporate Social Responsibility” (Beta, Interview, 13 April 2017). 
 
A fourth case defined social entrepreneurship by comparing it to traditional businesses and 
the motivation (“drive”) for pursuing one model or another.  
 
“In social enterprises, there is a bigger picture and there's another drive. 
The big difference in traditional companies [is that] there is money: that is 
the drive. But in [social entrepreneurship] it is the ideologically right thing 
to do” (Alfa, Interview, 31 March 2017). 
 
Finally, the two last cases refused to set clear boundaries to their notion of social 
entrepreneurship, but provided their understanding of social entrepreneurship based on their 
operational functionality. 
 
“We don't classify them in that way. We are more looking at if there is a 
real problem they want to solve. And then we have a business opportunity. 
Then, if that is for a social cause, it’s good” (Delta, Interview, 29 March 
2017). 
 
“I try to not define. But [...] I guess it is totally okay to get public funding 
for development costs. But if you can't run the basic operational functions 
without public funding, [then] you can't run the core business” (Kappa, 
Interview, 11 April 2017). 
 
The variety in responses indicates that the BSOs in our study lacked a common definition of 
social entrepreneurship, and thus vary in awareness. Each respondent framed their definition 
through their own lens. While all the respondents did offer the idea of holding some form of 
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giving back, they did not all connect to the same extent with the theoretical definitions 
provided in this study of what social entrepreneurship is. 
 
In order to better understand the cases’ conception of the social venture as an agent of social 
entrepreneurship, we asked the question “Are there ventures participating in your BSO that 
fit in the definition of social venture that you just provided?” The purpose of this question 
was beyond obtaining a yes or no answer, but also to obtain a deeper sense of the 
respondent’s interpretation of social entrepreneurship. As before, the answers to this question 
varied. 
 
It became apparent that Case Epsilon has a definition of social entrepreneurship which is 
more developed than the surface-level one they initially gave when asked. By having a clear 
image of the type of social venture they are looking for, they have been able to formulate a 
set of criteria for the admittance of these ventures into their program. 
 
“We work with start-ups that have impact as their core, within their core 
product and not as a layer on top of their business model. We always look 
for revenue streams with the start-ups participating and applying for [this 
accelerator]. This means that, if your sole purpose is to create an 
organization that relies on government funding only, then it is not so 
interesting for us. And to just describe the other end of the scale if you are 
working only to make a profit, then you are not applicable as well.” 
(Epsilon, Interview, 11 April 2017). 
 
Cases Alfa and Delta followed up with a notion of mission and business. Both place emphasis 
on the importance of establishing the economic model preferentially over the social mission. 
This extraction shows Alfa’s understanding. 
 
“The social aspect is just part of it [the social venture]. They need to make 
the business first otherwise they can't do the good and I think in supporting 
the business we support the social aspects [..] of that enterprise as well” 
(Alfa, Interview, 31 March 2017) 
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Rather than use labels such as social venture to separate the organizations they work with into 
categories, Delta utilizes the same traditional economic methods of thought to understand the 
goals of these ventures, then applies the outcomes of this to the social mission as an 
afterthought, rather than thinking through the social goal as an inherent and central aspect of 
the venture’s identity. 
 
Delta (Interview, 29 March 2017) says that when looking at social ventures 
they, “basically […] look at it in an economic way” 
 
Cases Zeta and Beta provided an experience based on their working with social ventures in 
their programs. They stated the struggle they face with participants that have developed an 
idea without a sustainable business model.  
 
“Some projects don't have the intention of making money. They just want to 
do something good: that something would be as a little social 
entrepreneurship. They don't want to have like a traditional business 
model; they want to try to get funded in other ways and just in order to help 
people get more knowledge about the environment, for example” (Zeta, 
Interview, 3 April 2017). 
“Students’ [...] projects can be quite hard because they don't want to see 
that they might need to have profits to make the company running; and very 
often they don't have the entrepreneurial skills that could be good for 
building a company” (Beta, Interview, 13 April 2017). 
 
Finally, case Kappa did not offer a definition for social venture. Kappa claimed to support 
social ventures that fall on an undetermined continuum between two poles: non-profits (e.g. 
an NGO) and for-profits (e.g. traditional business). 
 
“In Kappa we have everything from NGOs to more traditional business. 
And depending on which side you are, you come from a different side of the 
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problem. You are worried too much to do on your side and you're more 
dependent on funding” (Kappa, Interview, 11 April 2017). 
 
In looking at these quotes we see a wide array of awareness regarding a theoretical definition 
and practical application of what constitutes social entrepreneurship and a social venture. The 
BSOs vary from perceiving social ventures as a truly distinct form of business model, to 
seeing them as a modified version of traditional business methods. 
4.2 Tensions BSOs Noticed 
The BSOs noticed two distinct tensions that can be related to how the performing paradox 
affects hybrid organizations: “Vision Versus Execution in Social Ventures” and “’Doing 
Good’ Versus Profiting”. 
4.2.1 Vision Versus Execution in Social Ventures 
All the cases differed in their understanding of what differentiates a for-profit social venture 
from other forms of ventures. Yet, each could locate tensions they found to be more prevalent 
in socially oriented ventures than their for-profit counterparts.  
 
The first of these tensions is a direct conflict in the goals of the organizations. The cases 
noted that it is very prevalent that the founders of social ventures have a very strong social 
mission. The cases found that this mission, while important to the core of their venture, often 
hinders their creation and implementation of an economic model. Five of the cases placed 
focus upon this notion of big social mission overshadowing the economic execution in social 
ventures. 
 
Delta (Interview, 29 March 2017) states “They the [entrepreneurs] get 
stuck in that vision and can’t see what is the next step. I think that is a big 
challenge for social entrepreneurs…It is common in all types, but more 
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common and a bigger problem in organizations with a social side, because 
they have this big goal”. 
 
Alfa (Interview, 31 March 2017) affirm “[Social entrepreneurs] have a 
great vision and think for the vision to work financially they just have to 
focus on the vision and it will sell itself. That’s never the case and that's 
what we try to help [with]. We try to help them see the business part, that 
nothing will sell itself, you need to work with it and you need to focus on 
the right thing, which is money…It's very good to see the possibilities far 
away, but at some point, you need to get concrete, you need to do it. That's 
really what we're trying to do, pull them down and make them work on the 
next step, the small step, not the big step”. 
 
Zeta (Interview, 3 April 2017): “[Social venture founders] focus on the 
vision all the time. [...] They were always thinking about the next step, not 
the one where they gain customers and revenue, but rather the future way 
past that”.  
 
Kappa (Interview, 11 April 2017) observed that because of this vision 
“people tend to be more to one side…in their development [and become] 
soft on the business [side], leading them to become dependent on public 
funding losing the whole business dimension…To the point where they do 
not survive as a business and become an NGO”. 
 
Epsilon (Interview, 11 April 2017) stated, “A great handful of the start-ups 
we work with would actually benefit from having a founder that is more 
business oriented in their team”.  
All of the BSOs interviewed confirmed that they have noticed that social ventures frequently 
struggle to balance the aims of their two disparate business models. They show a concern for 
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the entrepreneur placing more emphasis on achieving their social mission than on completing 
the practical steps needed to make their venture economically sustainable. 
4.2.2 “Doing Good” Versus Profiting 
Most cases saw a large tension in the development of social ventures due to a social stigma 
that surrounds the prospect of making money as well as doing good. BSOs observed that 
“society has created a crack between social responsibility and making money” (Delta, 
Interview, 3 April 2017).  
 
Delta (Interview, 3 April 2017) continues “It’s not bad to make money. It's 
bad to not make something out of the money. Sometimes social 
entrepreneurs forget that. If you have a great solution you should charge 
people for it so you can get capital and you can put it into the system where 
it makes the most benefit. You need to make money…and as long as you 
have your vision it's okay. Not helping people for a year may give [the 
venture] the possibility to help ten times the people the next year, so 
sometimes you just need to build your business.” 
 
Zeta (Interview, 3 April 2017) claims, “It is a necessity to have some kind 
of revenue … in order to do good as well, because then you can sustain 
your own living…I tried to discuss the business model with [one] 
project…they weren’t that keen. They were more focused on getting 
contributions from the university, not in selling to the private sector. They 
wanted to have contributions from the state or public financing. But then it 
would be something you have to apply for all the time and you have to 
search for grants instead of having your own kind of revenue stream that 
you can tap into…It matters what kind of background you come from as 
well because I talked to some people [who] have done [humanities] 
degrees. And they are more; its ugly to earn money. It’s an ugly and dirty 
thing. For them that's a norm in their environment and maybe that becomes 
a hindering factor when they are doing their [venture].” 
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Beta (Interview, 13 April 2017) agrees that, “Often [social ventures] don't 
want to get money from the user. For example, they want to give something 
for free but they need money to make the company running so [they look] 
for different strategies to get some revenue without making the end user 
pay for it.” 
 
Alfa (Interview, 31 March 2017) states that, “If you can save the world you 
[still] need to focus on the money. Otherwise you never get a chance to do 
the good, because you've already failed; without money, you can't do it. So 
even in the sustainable and the social projects we need to have the 
business.”  
 
Alfa (Interview, 31 March 2017) says to have had a non-profit venture that 
“as a public funded idea they could not gain traction. [But after] focusing 
on an economic model the venture started to roll and build interest. Now 
[the founder] has seen that the way to do this good is through business.” 
 
However, Epsilon and Kappa did not share the view of this social stigma as a tension for 
social ventures. Both observed that it is common for social ventures to begin with public 
funding for development, and then move into an economically sustainable business model.  
 
Kappa (Interview, 11 April 2017) affirms “[For social ventures], public 
funding is not a strange place to start because, maybe you need to develop 
your service or product before you can start selling it and you need some 
kind of capital… [which is] extremely difficult to get from of investors in 
that early stage in Sweden”.  
 
Epsilon (Interview, 11 April 2017) states “Most of the start-ups we work 
with actually have considered, are considering, or have already obtained 
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some kind of public funding. That is the traditional way of operating an 
entity without revenue sources. For some part’s this is a need in order to 
actually survive; for others, it is already coherent in the business model or 
even in the start-up already. The ventures we support often already 
understand that a running financial business model is a part of running a 
social venture”. 
 
Kappa and Epsilon, the two BSOs that work only with social ventures, are also the two who 
did not consider this “social stigma” a problem. While the other BSOs have experienced this 
as a challenge to be overcome, they saw it as a natural part of the early development process 
of a social venture. 
4.3 BSOs Prefer to Focus on the Business Model Rather 
than a Social Venture’s Social Mission 
When describing the actions taken by the BSOs in relation to these tensions, most cases 
stated that their focus is on the business model rather than the social mission of the venture; 
first, because the economic aspect is needed to keep the venture moving, and then, because it 
is what the BSOs are focused on in their offering to for-profit ventures.  
Alfa (Interview, 31 March 2017) states “It's a company [a traditional 
business], so that is our focus. This is a company. We’re going to make 
money. That money can be put back into the company if you want, but we 
have to make money first…We focus on the business. So [there are] no 
special treatments for social ventures… [Every company] is the same. It's 
the same process and the same problem. It doesn't matter if you sell oil or if 
you sell solar cells, it's the same process”  
 
Similarly, Zeta (Interview, 3 April 2017) says “We don't really work any 
differently with a social venture than we do with a for-profit business… 
[We don’t] see the need for a dedicated method”. 
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Beta (Interview, 13 April 2017) agrees that, “In our advice, we ask 
questions related to if what they are economically doing follows their 
social [mission] and [then] try to give feedback that forces the founders to 
look at their venture from different viewpoints…This advice is very much 
case to case depending on the values they have…[However], the tools that 
we use do not change for these ventures”. 
 
Epsilon and Kappa are the exceptions to the previous observation. Both use development 
tools created specifically to help socially orientated ventures, such as the “Theory of Change 
Model” (Development Impact & You, 2011).  
 
Epsilon (Interview, 11 April 2017) states, “Traditional [support] models 
can be parted in two… [There are] two separate groups who benefit [from 
these businesses] and two value propositions… [The venture] has to find a 
balance between the groups and propositions. Where do you focus most? 
With the beneficiaries or the customers?” 
 
Epsilon (Interview, 11 April 2017) states, “To guide social ventures we 
utilize the Theory of Change Model. This is a development tool designed to 
run parallel with the normal Business Model Canvas. The Theory of 
Change Model use with the Business Model Canvas to make sure the social 
mission the venture wants to enact is held in the middle of the ventures 
structure. We also have developed our own formulas in order to monitor 
the social and economic sides of the venture.” 
 
Kappa (Interview, 11 April 2017) affirms “[We use an] impact model 
canvas or a social business model canvas. You put [the social impact] in as 
a component in the whole picture and see both the social and economic 
[sides]”. 
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The two BSOs who work exclusively with social ventures have developed a method that is 
specifically designed for the needs of these social ventures. Meanwhile, the traditional BSOs 
said that they treat social ventures in the same way as they handle traditional ventures, 
without making any adjustments to address the unique organizational structure they possess. 
Consequentially, traditional BSOs offer support for the economic aspects of a social venture 
without offering programs to support the social goal they are trying to reach. 
 
Additionally, it was found that as the traditional BSOs do not see the social mission as a part 
of the venture they need to address, they do not offer ways to measure the venture’s social 
output. Alfa (Interview, 31 March 2017) for instance, said that when measuring a venture’s 
success, “we don't really care about that kind of measurement [social output].” Meanwhile, 
Kappa and Epsilon, the two BSOs who work only with social ventures, utilize development 
tools specifically designed to work alongside traditional business tools, to keep both the 
financial objective and the social mission of the venture in focus (Theory of Change Model).  
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5 Analysis and Discussion 
5.1 What BSOs Understand About Social 
Entrepreneurship and Social Ventures 
This study first shows BSOs’ awareness of the concept of social entrepreneurship. Each study 
case provided a different definition or cited different aspects of this phenomenon, indicating a 
varied awareness of the characteristics of social ventures and their consequent tensions. 
Based on this finding, it is shown that all but two cases did not provide definitions that adjust 
to the relevant literature on social entrepreneurship. This agrees with and stands as an 
example of the general absence of an “overarching legal definition of social entrepreneurship 
or social enterprises” in Sweden (Persson & Hafen, 2014). 
 
The definition of social entrepreneurship provided by Epsilon, one of the two BSOs that work 
exclusively with social ventures, is closest in meaning to the definition on which this study is 
based. It centers on the entrepreneur as the agent, who performs an activity via social 
entrepreneurship that aims to impact the planet in a positive way. Similarly, the definition in 
this study states the “social-entrepreneur” is a “mission-driven individual” who “delivers a 
social value” (Abu-Saifan, 2012). Both definitions frame social entrepreneurship through the 
presence and relation of its two components. 
 
Another relevant aspect in Epsilon’s and Beta’s definition is the understanding of for-profit 
social ventures (Dees & Anderson, 2003; Yunus, 2010; Agafonow, 2015; Irene et al., 2015). 
Abu-Saifan (2012) defines this organization as an “entity that is financially independent, self-
sufficient, or sustainable,” that is utilized by an individual in order to provide social value to 
those in need. Similarly, Epsilon explains that when deciding whether to work with a venture, 
it must have the creation of social value as a central aspect of its identity, rather than as a side 
product to making a profit. Meanwhile, Beta expresses a similar idea, where a social venture 
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must be one that has some financial profitability, but holds its social impact as its central 
feature. These revenue systems allow businesses to generate an operating income, helping 
them reach economical sufficiency autonomously. 
 
On the other hand, both Delta and Kappa consciously avoid classifying or defining ventures 
as social ventures and do not offer a strict definition of social entrepreneurship or the social 
venture. Furthermore, neither addresses the interconnected nature of the organization’s dual 
missions: the social mission and the economically sustainable performance (Dees & 
Anderson, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009, Yunus et al., 2010). Delta focuses more on the 
opportunity recognition and exploitation process, in which being an entrepreneur is the ability 
to recognize potential ideas to exploit for a profit (Dimov, 2010). Alternatively, how Kappa 
perceives social ventures has more to do with how the ventures acquire their resources 
through the usage of public funding.  
 
Regarding the experience that the cases have in working with social ventures, three of them 
offer a hint of the thread that leads to the paradoxes and tensions, specifically the performing 
paradox, that for-profits face. Case Alfa states that their incubator prioritizes the economic 
sustainability of the venture before their mission, and that in order for the venture to create 
any social value, they must create an operational business model. This view in part 
compliments what Peredo & McLean (2006) state, in that a strong business is a means to 
achieve the social goal. 
 
Cases Beta and Zeta put forward the struggle they face while working with the participating 
ventures in their program. They mention that when working with ventures in their programs, 
they often struggle to interest the social entrepreneur in creating a business model from 
his/her idea. Beta and Zeta both cite a desire inside the entrepreneur to do good and an 
unwillingness to understand that in order to run a company, profits must be made. The BSOs 
feel that in this aspect the entrepreneurs fail to see that the business aspect of a for-profit 
social venture affects its viability by providing the necessary resources to operate without 
relying on grants or donations (Zeyen et al., 2014). 
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5.2 Noticed Tensions 
5.2.1 Founder Can Become Hostage of Their Vision 
 
All but one of the study cases observe that some founders adhere closely to the vision of their 
social mission. They notice in the founder an inability to identify and execute the necessary 
chain of actions to develop the venture. Instead, there is an over-eagerness to address the 
social goals of the future, while skipping the necessary step of gathering revenue. Case Delta 
mentions that founders cannot recognize the earlier steps, instead wanting to jump ahead to 
what they perceive as the most important part. Therefore, it can be argued that tensions 
related to the performing paradox can manifest directly in the founder's mind-set. The social 
and business goals exist in opposition to each other, and the founder wants to prioritize what 
they perceive as the more important goal, at the expense of the more relevant early needs of 
the venture. Furthermore, Delta observes that this tension is a more prevalent and impactful 
challenge for socially oriented organizations.  
 
For-profit social ventures find an imbalance in the equilibrium of their dual mission. In a 
social venture, “the passion and commitment of social entrepreneurs can lead to dominance 
of the social mission” (Smith et al., 2013, p. 411). When more emphasis is placed on the 
social mission, there is dissolution of the financial model (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Case 
Kappa observed how the social mission-oriented leader can cause the venture to become 
“soft” in the economic activity and potentially lose it entirely. Similarly, Delta observed that 
social entrepreneurs often focus predominantly on the social mission, which leads them away 
from financially sustainable models. Thus, the venture risks turning into a non-profit 
organization, rather than a for-profit social venture. This observation aligns with theory 
which states that when one side of a dual mission is favored over another, the secondary 
mission will be overrun and disappear (Smith et al., 2013; Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
 
 
 
5.2.2 “Doing Good” Versus Profiting 
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Four cases (Beta, Alfa, Delta, and Zeta) have observed disunion in founders of social 
ventures between the ability to “do good in the world” and to make a profit from that good 
through their ventures. According to the traditional BSOs interviewed, this disunion arises 
from a prevailing belief among social venture founders that making a profit from a social 
cause is unethical. 
 
Case Delta states, “society has created a crack between social responsibility and making 
money… if you have a social solution you should charge for it so that you can reinvest that 
profit into the venture to reach out to more people”. Beta sustains that often, the founders 
“don't want to get money from the user” or the one benefiting from their social cause, so they 
search for alternative forms of covering their operating expenses. Furthermore, Zeta states, 
many of the social ventures they work with are more likely founded by individuals that 
approach the issue from the social side, rather than the economic side. This leads the founder 
to be more attached to the goals of the social mission. 
 
The phenomenon that the cases observed is the tension that arises from competing logics of 
differentiated models (Douglas, 2015; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Besharov & Smith, 2014; 
Mason & Doherty, 2015). The first side is the economic mission where the venture acts as a 
traditional for-profit venture, by looking to create financial gain for its stakeholders through a 
for-profit structure (Dees & Anderson, 2003). At the same time, these ventures are operating 
under a charity model normally reserved for non-profit organizations (Jay, 2013). 
 
It has been stated previously that case Epsilon and Kappa use a definition of social 
entrepreneurship that is close to literature. These two BSOs view the tensions mentioned as a 
normal part of creating a social venture, rather than as a problem, and have adapted tools to 
mitigate and counter their negative effects. In contrast, we see that although the rest of the 
cases are aware of the vision versus purpose struggle and the purpose versus profit struggle, 
they don't have strategies targeted towards countering these issues. These BSOs are those 
whose definitions of social entrepreneurship stray furthest from the definition provided in the 
literature.  
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5.3 What Do BSOs Do About It? 
Regarding how founders become stuck in their vision, the five cases that are aware of this 
issue affirm that BSOs work towards making the founders focus on the immediate steps (e.g. 
customer contact and product-market fit). Yet even when this is successfully done, some 
founders may not stay focused on the small steps and instead will refocus on the vision. The 
case that offers the most concrete action to counter this issue is Epsilon, who states that in 
their program, they utilize tools specific to social ventures to force the venture to remain at a 
more neutral position in relation to their dual missions. This correlates with literature since, 
by achieving an equilibrium between their dual objectives, the social venture will be more 
able to avoid mission drift and avoid losing its financial model (Mason & Doherty, 2015; 
Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
 
The issue of purpose versus profit found in for-profit social ventures is perceived and 
managed by the BSOs in different ways. BSOs that are tailored towards social 
entrepreneurship (Epsilon and, to a lesser extent, Kappa) embrace this aspect as inherent to 
the social ventures. Both provide specific strategies to help their social ventures add the 
social mission into normative business development tools. These specialized tools are 
intended to allow the BSOs to help the social venture keep both missions at their core 
throughout their development process (McMullen & Warnick, 2016) By doing so, the BSOs 
help the ventures safeguard themselves from the potential of mission drift or financial 
dilution (McMullen & Warnick, 2016; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Smith et al., 2012). It is also 
consistent with Smith et al. (2013), who states that the pursuit of commercial success helps 
reinforce a social venture’s mission through exploring opportunities, higher pay, or 
increasing the area they impact. 
 
On the other hand, BSOs that work with traditional for-profits perceive this as an unnatural 
problem. They focus on providing the ventures with advice on revenue streams without 
tailoring to their needs. For example, Zeta claims not to work any differently with social 
ventures than with for-profit businesses. This attitude towards working with social ventures 
indicates that the noticeable tensions inherent to the structure of social ventures (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011) may go untreated by the BSOs whose job it is to aid the 
venture (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005; Cohen, 2013; Casasnovas & Bruno, 2013).  
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BSOs that are not tailored for the needs of for-profit social ventures often focus on the 
economic aspect. For example, Alfa argues that ventures must focus on making profit, just 
like any other company would. Zeta holds a similar view, with the belief that financial 
sustainability is the most crucial aspect for creating successful ventures. This treatment of the 
social ventures by the BSOs may leave the ventures at higher risk of the economic objective 
overpowering the social mission, as this viewpoint pushes the social objective of the ventures 
into a position of being a byproduct of what the venture does, rather than one of the central 
aspects of its organization function (McMullen & Warnick, 2016; Battilana & Lee, 2014; 
Smith et al., 2013). This idea of tailoring the support of social ventures in the same way a 
BSO would support a for-profit venture is in line with the misalignment of objectives that 
Soetanto and Jack (2013) note exists between BSOs and the ventures they support. Soetanto 
and Jack (2013) remark on the idea that BSOs are aiming to offer the most standardized set of 
supports they can to the ventures in their system, while the ventures themselves are looking 
for the program that offers the most to fulfill their individual needs for assistance.  
 
When looking at the entirety of how these organizations work with social ventures, we find 
that the BSOs who focus exclusively on assisting social ventures directly address the inherent 
tensions they face due to their hybridity. While the BSOs who predominantly work with for-
profit ventures can also see the tensions social ventures face, they perceive that the correct 
functioning of the business aspect of the model can pull the venture through. Therefore, they 
focus primarily on that aspect of the venture. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Main Conclusions  
This study set out to explore how much awareness Swedish BSOs have about the 
characteristics of social ventures and the performing tensions related to their hybridity. Also, 
to explore the type of support BSOs give to for-profit social ventures in relation to these 
tensions by using the answers regarding the previous questions. This aim meant looking for 
an answer to the following questions: How much awareness do BSOs have of the 
characteristics of social ventures and the tensions related to their hybridity? What type of 
support do they offer social ventures, particularly related to hybridity tensions? 
 
This study illustrates two of the main tensions that BSOs have experienced when working 
with social ventures. One is the stress between the founder’s vision and the execution of the 
necessary activities to achieve this vision. This means that, sometimes, social venture 
founders can become hostages of their own vision. The second tension is the stress between 
purpose and profit. Some ventures may seek to fulfill their social mission (purpose) without a 
clear view of how to sustain their operation (namely, generating revenue). Smith et al. (2013) 
warn that this issue can hinder the venture’s chances of growing or make them fail. 
 
This research revealed relevant aspects regarding the awareness BSOs have of these tensions. 
More socially-oriented BSOs tend to perceive this issue as inherent to the model of a for-
profit social venture and have been able to create tools that can be utilized to mitigate the 
negative effects of these tensions while still keeping the dual objectives of the venture at its 
heart. In contrast, traditional BSOs tend to approach this issue as a problem, instead of 
inherent to the model. Both approaches reflect how the two types of BSO manage to counter 
this issue. Only the two BSOs that were more affiliated with socially orientated ventures used 
tools developed to highlight the steps a social venture needs to take to become self-
sustaining. In doing so they are attempting to defend the venture against the possibility that 
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either mission overshadows the other. Thus, they are helping keep the venture economically 
sustainable while still holding a social benefit. 
 
The other cases tried to counter this issue by providing advice discussing the benefits of a for-
profit model to the ventures. This is because while BSOs do observe the tensions of the 
venture, they prioritize the business model as they perceive that as their role in supporting the 
nascent business. They do not differentiate their offering between social ventures and solely 
for-profit ventures, so both organizational forms are offered a standardized program that is 
not tailored to their individual needs. This agrees with Soetanto and Jack’s (2013) proposal 
that there is a disconnect between the ventures that take part in BSOs and the BSOs 
themselves, in that the ventures are looking for support focused on helping them with a 
specific need while the BSOs are looking to standardize their offering as much as possible. 
Consequently, the traditional BSOs’ advice is built based on serving the needs of traditional 
ventures. They focus on the venture developing an economically sustainable business model 
without regard for how the social aspect may operate in this version. Many of them cited their 
belief that creating a solid business foundation will make it possible for the social mission to 
develop as an afterthought. This belief reflects a different understanding of the nature of 
social ventures and entrepreneurship, in comparison to the stance that they exist with two 
central objectives at their core. This attitude towards working with a social venture may lead 
to the social aspect being removed from the venture as more focus gets placed on the 
economic mission instead (Smith et al., 2013; McMullen & Warnick, 2016; Battilana & Lee, 
2014). 
 
It can be concluded that the approach a BSO takes to manage the tensions within for-profit 
social ventures is correlated to the understanding of the phenomenon of social 
entrepreneurship and social venture. The BSOs that were tailored for social ventures worked 
with a definition of social entrepreneurship and for-profit social venture that is consistent 
with the relevant literature. Yet, of these two, only one explicitly recognized the elements 
within the definition (i.e. the social entrepreneur, its behavior and its purpose). The BSO with 
this definition was also the BSO that had built measurement systems of success tailored to the 
needs and goals of the for-profit social ventures. The two BSOs who presented an 
understanding of social entrepreneurship similar to the definition utilized in literature 
(Epsilon and Kappa) were the two programs that appeared to have developed systems of 
recognition and mitigation of the inherent tensions that are specific to social ventures. 
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On the other hand, what the other cases understand for social entrepreneurship and for-profit 
social venture aligns less closely with relevant aspects of the literature. The definition from 
literature highlights the interconnected core that lies within every social venture; this core is 
composed of the positive social impact and a financially sustainable business model. In this 
case, the BSOs understand social ventures without accounting for this duality. Namely, they 
perceive the social mission as an “add-on” to a traditional business.  
 
6.2 Contributions and Further Research 
 
This study makes theoretical contributions to the study fields of business support 
organizations, social ventures, and paradoxes and tensions found in hybrid organizations. By 
researching how BSOs identify and work with their inherent tensions, this study has 
broadened the understanding of how social ventures are supported in BSOs. In doing so, it 
has found a disparity between the support given to social ventures from traditional BSOs and 
socially-orientated BSOs, which is based on different understandings of social 
entrepreneurship between traditional BSOs and socially-oriented BSOs. 
 
This study may also have practical implications for founders of social ventures and BSOs. 
Given this study’s understanding of the different ways in which BSOs understand social 
ventures, future research may address the relative effectiveness of both methods 
 
It is important, however, to understand the limitations in this study. The first limitation is 
geographical. By choice of the authors, this study is limited to BSOs working in the Skåne 
region in Sweden. Therefore, the results of this study cannot be generalized at a national or 
global level. The second limitation regards the cases studied. BSOs are represented by only 
one individual from each organization. This does not allow a complete view of how the BSO 
works. The third limitation regards timeframe. This study was conducted over the period of 
five months, and as such it is hard to evaluate how the view of the BSOs on social 
entrepreneurship and social ventures has evolved over time. As a result of the authors’ choice 
to focus solely on incubators and accelerators in Skåne, this paper is unable to gain a broader 
understanding of the BSO organizational network as a whole, in how it relates to social 
ventures. Other BSOs may have a different level of awareness of the tensions that social 
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ventures face and may react against them differently. Hence, this study is limited in its 
generalizability to other BSO models. 
 
Future research should conduct a more thorough investigation of the understanding and 
tactics that other forms of BSO use in dealing with social entrepreneurs and their ventures. 
Research can also be conducted to better understand the long-term effect of the for-profit 
based advice traditional BSOs give to for-profit social ventures. To look more in depth at this 
problem, a study could benefit from interviewing all the individuals involved with the BSO 
as well as the different participating ventures. Additionally, a quantitative study can be 
conducted investigating the survival rate of for-profit social ventures that work with socially 
oriented BSOs versus those who work with traditional BSOs. Future research may also 
consider how the findings of this study compare to the support given to for-profit social 
ventures by BSOs in other geographic and economic regions, and should look at how BSOs 
may help social ventures mitigate other paradoxes that are not discussed in this paper. Lastly, 
future research should address the effectiveness of BSOs in working with social ventures, and 
the possibility of a causal relationship between BSOs’ understanding of social ventures, how 
they work with them, and how effective they are. 
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Appendix A – Interview Guide 1 
 
Overview of the BSO 
 
• What does your organization do? Please describe your role in your organization. 
• Does your organization provide capital, working space and/or mentorship? 
• What is the average number of founder in each venture that joins your program? 
• How would you define a social-oriented business? 
• Have you worked or are currently working with companies that fit that definition? 
• Of the social venture that you have worked with how many have become successful 
businesses once they left your organization? 
• Have you seen an increase in interest in socially oriented businesses? (If yes) Why do 
you think more are moving towards this rather than NGO models? 
 
Awareness of the tensions by the BSO 
 
• How does the addition of a social mission effect the venture? 
• Would say these start-ups face and difficulties or challenges that traditional ventures 
do not face? Are there any challenges they face to a higher degree than traditional 
businesses? 
o How do you help the venture manage these issues? 
• How does sustainability oriented model affect the overall team and business growth of 
an organization? How does it change team dynamics? Provide examples. 
• Literature on social entrepreneurship theorizes that often in socially oriented business 
there is a pull to either the financial aspect or the social aspect do you see this as a 
threat? 
o This often creates an issue where the other side dies  
• Do individuals actors in the venture ever identify more with one aspect of the venture 
(social mission or economic gain)? 
• Have you seen the goals of the entrepreneur take over the venture to where it no 
longer functioned under your understanding of a socially-oriented business? 
• How do you the internal processes of these organizations as being structured? 
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• When advising a social venture are you ever aware of a disconnect between the profit 
side of the company and the social side? If so how do you try to connect these two? 
• Ask directly about the different tensions: 
o Performing - Different goals from different people, Focus on one aspect over 
the rest 
o Organizing - Structural and process oriented conflicts internal to the 
organization; 
o Learning - Issues with measurement; 
o Belonging - Internal tension of conflicting identities 
Actions taken in response to the tensions 
• How do you, as a business development manager/coach, help social businesses deal 
with these tensions? This can happen at different stages: idea, business modelling, 
starting up, operating. 
• When helping a social Venture in your program with their business plan, how do you 
incorporate the social mission into their economic growth model? 
• As financials tend to be short term and social measurements tend to be long term. 
What metrics do you apply to evaluate both the social mission of social ventures and 
their financial gain? 
• Are there any methods you use to get someone wrapped up in the social mission 
aspect to realize the commercial side as well? 
• Is there a risk of destroying either revenue or destroying the positive impact? By 
necessity of preferring one over the other? 
• Are the social missions of the ventures you have helped in Sweden or international?  
• In a team venture have you ever seen conflict between one founder who is more 
invested in the social mission and other who is more invested in the monetary gain? 
• With growth as a major goal how do you make sure it doesn't hinder the social 
mission? 
Closing Questions 
• If you were working with a social venture what would you prefer they sacrifice: their 
social mission (become fully for-profit) or their financial sustainability (become Non-
profit/NGO)? Why? 
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Appendix B – Interview Guide 2 
 
Follow Up Questions 
 
• In our past interview, you stated that if a venture you were working with had to 
choose to sacrifice their social mission or their financial sustainability you answered 
that you would prefer they sacrifice _________. Is there any one core aspect of your 
work that leads you to believing this is the best path for the ventures you work with? 
 
• Do you feel the need to learn more about social ventures and the different issues they 
face or is that out of your hands? 
 
• Questions dependent upon results of previous interview focused around how the 
interviewee see’s their role in the ventures process. 
 
 
 
